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Relief to Subsequent Home
Purchasers in Kentucky:
The Past, Present, Future, and Franz
BY D. BRENT MARSHALL*
INTRODUCTION
P icture if you will: Adam and Bert have recently bought homes
next door to each other. Both have worked long and hard to
save enough money for down payments, and like most Americans, these
purchases are the most significant purchases of their lives.' Adam bought
Ins newly constructed home from a developer, Carl's Construction. Bert
bought his house from a couple who had also purchased their newly
constructed home from Carl's Construction around the same time Adam's
was built. Neither Adam nor Bert are builders by trade, and m fact both
know very little about the construction of a house. Not long after both
Adam and Bert moved into their respective homes, both discovered major
problems m the construction of their basements. It seemed that every time
it ramed, both basements filled with water.
Histoncally, neither Adam nor Bert could recover damages from Carl
m the absence of an express warranty in the contract of sale or deed.2 In
the middle of tis century, as consumer expectations changed in the face
of progressive warranty laws regarding the sale of chattels, the courts
began to allow home purchasers to maintain causes of action against
builders.3 Within the last twenty years, the majority of jurisdictions has
also elected to give relief to subsequent purchasers, realizing that both
original and subsequent purchasers are essentially m the same position.4
* J.D. expected 1997, Uiversity of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. 1994,
Duke Umversity.
' See Petersen v Hubschman Constr. Co., 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill.
1979) (discussing the significance of the purchase of a home).
2 See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
3 See nfra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 40-95 and accompanying text.
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In October of 1994, in the case of Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v.
Franz,' the Supreme Court of Kentucky was given the opportunity to
join the majority and afford a remedy to a subsequent purchaser of a
home. This Note will look at the facts of the Franz case,6 examine the
history and current status of the many different remedies available to
subsequent purchasers from which the Franz court had to choose,7
discuss the avenue Kentucky ultimately took in the Franz case,' and
analyze the Franz decision and its impact on home buyers in Kentucky 9
I. REAL ESTATE MiRKE7NG, INC. V FRANZ:
JUST THE FACrS
First Lexington" built and sold a house to the Careys on September
1, 1985. Four years later, the Careys sold the same house to the plamtiffs,
Michael and Kim Franz. While the Careys still owned the house, they
complained to First Lexington about several problems with the house,
including moisture around the front foyer and uneven flooring. Following
arbitration proceedings pursuant to an insurance policy issued on behalf
of First Lexington by the Homeowner's Warranty Corporation and the
Homeowner's Warranty Insurance Corporation, First Lexington did some
repair work on the house. Additional problems with the house followed,
including "a slight separation of the chimney from the house."" The
Careys were forced to deal with these problems themselves, however, as
a second clami under the homeowner's warranty was demed. 2
To nd themselves of the house and its problems, the Careys sold the
home to the Franzes. 3 Soon after moving into the home, the Franzes
"began experiencing problems of their own, including water leaking into
s Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v Franz, 885 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1994).
6 See mnfra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 17-95 and accompanying text.
8 See mnfra notes 96-112 and accompanying text.
9 See mfra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
'0 Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v. Franz, 885 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1994).
The named defendants m the case were Real Estate Marketing, Inc. and Robert
T. Mayes, f/d/b/a First Lexington Company. For the purposes of this Note, the
defendant will be referred to as "First Lexington."
11 Id.
12id.
"s Id. The duty of the Careys to disclose defects m the home was not
addressed by the Franz court, and discussion of whether such a duty exists, or
should exist, is beyond the scope of this Note.
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the front hallway, warping of the parquet and linoleum flooring, and
mold and mildew."' 4 The Franzes claimed the defects m the house were
the result of "improper construction and poor workmanship of the builder,
First Lexington, m violation of the building code in force by application
of statute and local ordinance."'
5
In its defense, First Lexington responded that the Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Government's Division of Building Inspection granted
First Lexington a Certificate of Occupancy on September 4, 1985. The
builders claimed that the Certificate of Occupancy was issued "upon a
finding that construction complied with the applicable building code" and,
therefore, they were not liable to the Franzes.' 6 Given the parties'
positions, it was then for the courts of Kentucky to voice their opinion on
one of the most highly debated issues in modem law- What relief, if any,
should the subsequent purchasers of a home be given against the builder?
II. A HISTORY OF THE CAUSES
OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO HOME BUYERS
While the debate m the field of real estate today is whether to give
subsequent purchasers a cause of action against the builder 7 of their
home 8 for latent defects,' 9 there was a time when even the original
purchaser did not have such a cause of action. For centuries, the law of
caveat emptor governed the sale of both personal and real property, and
under that regime, in the absence of fraud or an express warranty, a cause
'4 Id.
Is Id.
16 id.
" For purposes of this Note, a "builder" is a builder-vendor, or one who is
in the business of building houses upon land owned by the builder-vendor and
who then sells the homes together with the lots to the public. This arrangement
is distinguished from a builder who is privately contracted by a landowner to
build a home on the landowner's lot.
18 For purposes of this Note, "home" or "house" refers to a dwelling
permanently constructed on real property. For products liability cases involving
trailers or mobile homes, see generally Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Products
Liability: Liability for Injury or Death Allegedly Caused by Defect in Mobile
Home or Trailer, 81 A.L.R3d 421 (1977).
19 For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that all defects for which an
initial or subsequent purchaser of a home may have a cause of action are latent
defects. Cases in which courts have expressly stated that the alleged defect was
obvious or patent are beyond the scope of this Note.
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of action for latent defects could not be sustained.20 In time, due to
changing markets and consumer expectations, the courts abandoned the
doctrine of caveat emptor in transactions involving the sale of chattels2
and the courts began to move toward allowing a cause of action.22 The
implied warranty became part of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Uniform Sales Act,2" both of which firmly established relief from the
inequities of caveat emptor in the sale of chattels.
20 Linda M. Libertucci, Comment, Builder's Liability to New and Subse-
quent Purchasers, 20 Sw. U. L. REV 219, 220 (1991). The doctrine of caveat
emptor first appeared in English law in 1603 in the case of Chandelor v Lopus,
79 Eng. Rep. 3 (K.B. 1603) (in wich a merchant was sued for selling a
worthless rock which he claimed was a valuablejewel). The doctrine was widely
used by Americanjunsdictions after the American Revolution, and, in 1870, the
Supreme Court recogmzed the universal use of the doctrine in Barnard v
Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383 (1870) (in which the sale of wool in bales was
allowed even though only a small sample of the bales had been inspected). As
one commentator noted, the rationale behind applying the doctrine to real
property was that home purchasers had the same "ability, means and opportunity
to inspect the [home] in a manner equal to the seller." Id. As a result, in the
absence of any express warranties or fraud, the buyer was unable to maintain a
cause of action against the seller or builder. With the buyer's acceptance of the
deed, the contractual relationship between the parties had terminated and the
rights of the parties were limited to the specific language of the deed itself.
The often-quoted court in Osborne v Howard, 242 S.W 852 (Ky. 1922)
firmly established Kentucky's stance on the doctrine of caveat emptor by stating:
It is an ancient rule inherited from the common law, and well estab-
lished in our jurisprudence, that in land deals the rule of caveat
emptor applies, and it is only relaxed when it is shown that the vendor
does something to prevent the prospective purchaser from making a
thorough examination of the premises to ascertain its nature and value,
or when the property, which is the subject of the sale, lies at great
distance from the parties to the trade, and the purchaser has no
reasonable opportunity to visit and examine it.
Id. at 853.
21 WiLLIAm L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 636 (4th ed.
1971).
2 This movement began with the case of Holcombe v Hewson, 170 Eng.
Rep. 1194 (1810). The court in that case recogmzed the need for chattels to be
of fair merchantable quality and chose to impose a warranty against inferior
products even though the parties themselves had not expressly created one.
23 Lloyd E. Ferguson, Note, Gupta v Ritter Homes, Inc.. Extending the
Implied Warranty of Habitability to Subsequent Purchasers - An Honorable
Result Based on Unsound Theory, 35 BAYLOR L. REv 670, 673 (1983).
486 [Vol. 85
1996-97] RELIEF TO SUBSEQUENT HOME PURCHASERS
With much reluctance, the state courts began to apply implied
warranties to the sale of real property The trend began in 1957 with the
landmark Ohio case of Vanderschrier v. Aaron,24 in which the court
found an implied warranty by the builder of a home that the dwelling was
fit for human habitation.2" The application of the implied warranty of
habitability to the sale of newly constructed homes began because the
nature of buying a home had evolved to become much like the process
of purchasing chattels. Courts for centuries had justified the use of caveat
emptor in the sale of real property by claiming that both parties to the
sale of a home were of equal bargaining position, skill, and expen-
ence.26 These justifications simply do not hold true today 27 After the
Second World War, the housing market skyrocketed. Poor craftsmanship
was an inevitable result of the increase in demand and subsequent rush
to construct postwar housing. Purchasers of new homes, who for years
had relied on implied warranties of merchantability when purchasing their
personal items, flooded the courts seeking similar relief against the
builders of their defective homes.28 In response to the changing market
and public demands, the courts began to move away from caveat emptor.
This opportunity for change was summed up recently by one commenta-
tor:
In today's world of mass production and specialization, the home
purchaser simply cannot be expected to have the detailed knowledge of
homes acquired by those m the business. Now the purchaser relies on
the expertise of the builder-vendor. The modem purchaser usually
has neither the time nor the money to hire experts to check a home for
latent defects. The builder would be unjustly rewarded if his
knowledge and expertise in building sound and secure homes with no
hidden defects was imputed to the ordinary consumer.29
The roots of the causes of action for the home buyer, therefore, lie
in public policy The purchaser of a new home today is in essentially the
24 Vanderschner v. Aaron, 140 N.E.2d 819 (Oio 1957).
25 See generally Robert L. Cherry, Jr., Builder Liability for Used Home
Defects, 18 REAL EST. L.J. 115 (1989).
26 Joseph C. Brown, Jr., The Implied Warranty of Habitability Doctnne in
Residential Property Conveyances: Policy-Backed Change Proposals, 62 WASH.
L. REv 743, 743 (1987).
27 Libertucci, supra note 20, at 222.
28 Brown, supra note 26, at 744.
29 Libertucci, supra note 20, at 220-21.
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same situation as is the purchaser of chattel, and the courts have long
recognized causes of action for the latter category 30 Purchasers of new
homes have a right to believe they are buying homes free of defects, and
courts have become increasingly sympathetic to the plight of the home
buyer. This sympathy has furthered the development of the doctrine, the
scope and application of which "seems to be limited only by the
ingenuity of plaintiffs and the forbearance of the courts."'
With the increasing acceptance of implied warranties, initial pur-
chasers of homes can now rely on a builder's good faith and skill.32
Courts have justified this "buyer reliance" because buyers have the ex-
pectations of a consumer and are not accustomed to acting in a caveat
emptor world.33 Consumers are accustomed to buying "goods [with]
mimmum implied warranties attached., 34 Consumers are accustomed to
"getting what they paid for."35 Courts honor these expectations because
buyers of new houses have no reason for believing that the particular
purchase should be treated differently from any other purchase.36 In fact,
for most buyers, the purchase of a house is the single biggest purchase
of their lives.37 It is easy to see why the courts allow purchasers of new
homes to believe they are protected. Today, the vast majority of states, 8
30 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
" David L. Abney, DeterminingDamagesfor Breach ofImplied Warranties
in Construction Defect Cases, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 210, 210 (1988).
32 Libertucci, supra note 20, at 223. See, e.g., Petersen v. Hubschman
Constr. Co., 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill. 1979) (in buying a new home, there is
a "dependent relationship of the vendee to the vendor").
33 Brown, supra note 26, at 747; see also Leo Bearman, Jr., Caveat Emptor
in Sales ofRealty-RecentAssaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv 541, 549-
52 (1961).
3' Brown, supra note 26, at 747
31 Id. (quoting E.F Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer- The
Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 835-36 (1967)).
36 id.
31 Petersen v Hubschman Constr. Co., 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill. 1979).
38 Cherry, supra note 25, at 115. The implied warranty of habitability was
first established in Kentucky in 1969 in the case of Crawley v Terhune, 437
S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969). In that case, Dan Terhune and his wife purchased a new
house from Robert Crawley, Sr., the builder. Title was transferred and several
months after moving into the home, the Terhunes discovered that ram water
would come through the walls of the basement and would not dram out. The
Terhunes sued the builder based on a claim of breach of an implied warranty of
habitability. At trial, the jury entered a verdict for the Terhunes. Id. at 744. In
the Terhunes' claim against the builder, evidence was submitted showing that
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including Kentucky, allow initial purchasers of homes a cause of action
for latent defects.39
"the basement walls were not so constructed as to withstand surface water
pressure, being of concrete block with no coating or sealing; there was an
absence of dram tile around the outside of the house; and the basement floor did
not have proper drainage facilities." Id. at 745. In addition, expert testimony
from an architect and an engineer established that the "construction did not
conform to accepted practices and standards." Id. The court reasoned that if
Kentucky were to have a cause of action based on the implied warranty of
habitability, the facts of Terhune would certainly yield relief under such a
doctrine. Hence, in a brief opiuon, the court applied the implied warranty to the
sale of a home by a builder to an initial purchaser.
At the time, the majority rule among the states was that there was no such
implied warranty in the sale of a home. The court m Terhune recognized this fact
and instead chose to follow the growing number of states who followed the
minority rule. In giving its reasons for following the minority rule, the court in
Terhune stated:
Because the caveat emptor rule is completely unrealistic and
mequitable as applied in the case of the ordinary mexpenenced buyer
of a new house from the professional builder-seller, and because a
contract by the builder to sell a new house is not much distinguishable
from a contract to build a house for another, we are disposed to adopt
the minority view to the extent of holding that in the sale of a new
dwelling by the builder there is an implied warranty that in its major
structural features the dwelling was constructed in a workmanlike
manner and using suitable materials.
Id.
" For cases outside of Kentucky which allow for an initial purchaser of a
home to recover for latent defects based on a suit for negligent construction, see
Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427 (Ariz. 1984); Murphy v
Sheftel, 9 P.2d 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932); Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v Weller,
663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983); Caporaletti v A-F Corp., 137 F Supp. 14 (D.C.
D.C. 1956), rev'don other grounds, 240 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Gatwood v
McGee, 475 So. 2d 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Williams v Rumon, 325
S.E.2d 441 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Mincy v. Cnsler, 96 So. 162 (Miss. 1923);
Ked-Wick Corp. v Levinton, 681 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App. 1984); Oremus v
Wynhoff, 123 N.W.2d 441 (Wis. 1963). For cases outside of Kentucky which
allow an initial purchaser of a home to recover for latent defects based on some
type of implied warranty, seeF & S. Constr. Co. v. Berube, 322 F.2d 782 (10th
Cir. 1963); Crocker v Reed, 420 So. 2d 285 (Ala. Civ App. 1982); Woodward
v Chirco Constr. Co., Inc., 687 P.2d 1269 (Ariz. 1984); Pickier v Fisher, 644
S.W.2d 644 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 525 P.2d
88 (Cal. 1974); Bethlahmyv. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698 (Idaho 1966); Weckv A:M
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Just as public policy demands a cause of action for an initial
purchaser against a builder, the same public policy also demands a cause
of action for subsequent purchasers. Within the last twenty years, states
have begun to recognize causes of action for the subsequent purchaser
against the builder of the home.4" Today, subsequent purchasers are
given causes of action in negligence," the extension of the implied
warranty of habitability,42 and most recently, strict liability43
A. Negligence
One of the earliest requirements for a cause of action against the
builder of a home was contractual privity "Like the doctrine of caveat
emptor, the requirement of contractual privacy began in England." In
the case of Winterbottom v. Wright4 in 1842, the court expressed
concern that a defendant may be subject to liability from an unlimited
number of plaintiffs. Therefore, contractual privity was established to
prevent situations in which there would be "no point at which such
Sunrise Constr. Co., 184 N.E.2d 728 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962); Theis v Heuer, 280
N.E.2d 300 (Ind. 1972); Kirk v. Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1985); Loch
Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 399 A.2d 883 (Md. 1979); Allison v Home Say
Ass'n, 643 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Chandler v Madsen, 642 P.2d
1028 (Mont. 1982); Norton v Burleaud, 342 A.2d 629 (N.H. 1975); Sclhpperv
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965); De Roche v. Dame, 430 N.Y.S.
2d 390 (N.Y App. Div. 1980); Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., Inc., 225
S.E.2d 557 (N.C. 1976); Rutledge v Dodenhoff, 175 S.E.2d 792 (S.C. 1970);
Waggoner v Midwestern Dev., Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967); Humber v
Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Bolkum v Staab, 346 A.2d 210 (Vt.
1975); Klos v Gockel, 554 P.2d 1349 (Wash. 1976); Tavares v Horstman, 542
P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). For an example of a case which allows an initial
purchaser of a home to recover for latent defects based on strict liability, see
State Stove Mfg. Co. v Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966). But see Nastn v
Wood Bros. Homes, Inc., 690 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
40 Cherry, supra note 25, at 115.
4' See infra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
42 Cherry, supra note 25, at 115. See infra notes 67-83 and accompanying
text.
43 See infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
44Conme S. Granata, Note, From Buyer Beware to Builder Beware - The
Subsequent Purchaser's Cause ofAction Against the Builder, 11 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 143, 145 (1987).
41 Winterbottom v Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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actions would stop."' The requirement of pnvity was first dropped in
negligence actions involving personal property,4 7 and eventually courts
began loosening the requirement in actions involving real property 48
One of the first cases to drop the pnvity requirement and allow
subsequent purchasers of homes to bring a cause of action against the
builder was Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc.,49 decided by the Supreme
Court of Connecticut m 1977 In that case, the plaintiffs purchased a
home from a seller who had the home constructed by the defendant
builder. After the plaintiffs moved into the home, the septic system,
wich had onginally been installed by the builder, failed. The court
allowed the plaintiffs to recover on their theory of negligence in spite of
the absence of pnvity of contract, stating that "[t]he fact that we are
dealing here with a suit by a subsequent purchaser is not fatal to the
negligence claim since the requirement of pnvity should only be
applicable to actions growing out of contract theory and should be
irrelevant to tort actions.""0
A more recent case which allowed recovery for a subsequent
purchaser based on negligence is Oates v. JAG, Inc."1 In that case, the
Oates, as subsequent purchasers, bought a house from a seller which had
been constructed by the defendant, JAG, Inc.52 After moving into the
home, the Oates, according to the allegations in their complaint,
"discovered numerous defects, faulty workmanship, and negligent
construction of the residence."53 Like the Coburn court, the North
46 Granata, supra note 44, at 145.
4 Privity of contract was first relaxed in 1916 to give a subsequent
purchaser of non-real property a cause of action for negligence in the seminal
case of MacPherson v Bmck Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y 1916). In that
case, Justice Cardozo held that although the purchaser of an automobile did not
purchase the automobile directly from the defendant, the plaintiff could still sue
the defendant for negligence. Id. Since the decision in MacPherson, courts have
been eliminating the pnvity requirement m negligence actions. In the majority
of states today, the rule is "that where a person undertakes to do an act or
discharge a duty, liability for negligence in the breach of this duty is in no way
dependent on the existence of any pnvity of contract between the person guilty
of the negligence and the person suffering an Injury as a result thereof." Cherry,
supra note 25, at 118.
48 Cherry, supra note 25, at 118.
'9 Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 378 A.2d 599 (Conn. 1977).
so Id. at 602.
"' Oates v. JAG, Inc., 333 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1985).
52 Id.
" Id. at 224 (These include "the installation of a dram pipe which had been
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Carolina Supreme Court in Oates declared that an action in negligence is
not affected by the absence of pnvity The court m Oates adopted the
rule from another jurisdiction that "'t]he absence of contractual privity
between plaintiff and defendant does not affect plaintiff's tort claim,
provided plaintiff can establish the existence of a duty between the
parties, and defendant's breach of such duty, with the proximate result
that plaintiff suffered the damages of which it complains."' 54
Due to the relaxation of the privity requirement, many courts today
allow subsequent purchasers of homes, to recover damages for latent
defects in their homes through a negligence cause of action.55 From the
builder's point of view, it is this cause of action that subjects the builder
to the most potential liability 56 "This is due to the expansive pool of
potential plaintiffs, including anyone within the areas of forseeable risk
(such as original and subsequent purchasers, adjacent property owners,
homeowner associations, lenders, etc.). 57 An additional factor, which
opens builders up to great potential liability under negligence claims, is
that many jurisdictions which allow such a cause of action also follow the
discovery rule.5" The discovery rule states that a plaintiff's cause of
action does not accrue until the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the defect. This rule potentially subjects a builder to liability from
purchasers for many years after construction is completed.59
cut, the failure to use grade-marked lumber, the failure to comply with specific
provisions of the North Carolina Uniform Residential Building Code pertaining
to certain weight bearing requirements, improper and insufficient nailing on
bridging and beams, and faulty and shoddy workmanship.").
54 Id. at 225 (quoting Navajo Circle, Inc. v Development Concepts Corp.,
373 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).
" See Knegler v EichlerHomes Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1969); Wright v Creative Corp., 498 P.2d 1179 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Cobum
v Lenox Homes, Inc., 378 A.2d 599 (Conn. 1977); Simmons v Owens, 363 So.
2d 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 P.2d 849 (Okla.
1961); Terlinde v Neely, 271 S.E.2d 768 (S.C. 1980); Moxley v. Laranue
Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
56 Joseph G. Wagman & Judy H. Chen, Liability for Defective Work -
Drafting Contract Provisions From the General Contractor's Perspective,
CONSTR. LAw. 1, 32, May 1990.
57 Id. at 32-33.
5 1 Id. at 33.
59 Id. But see Shirkey v. Mackey, 399 S.E.2d 868 (W Va. 1990) (refusing
to adopt the discovery rule on the grounds that it would completely defeat the
ten-year statute of limitations applicable to architects and builders).
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Courts that have refused to extend a cause of action based on
negligence to subsequent purchasers have looked, along with privity, to
the requirement of actual physical damages as opposed to allowing
recovery for a mere economic loss. Economic loss has been defined as:
"damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the
defective product, or the consequent loss of profits as well as the
diminution in value of the product because it is inferior in quality
to recover in negligence there must be a showing of harm above and
beyond disappointed expectations. A buyer's desire to enjoy the benefit
of Is bargain is not an interest that tort law traditionally protects."6
In many states allowing the economic loss defense, damages for
economic loss may be obtained only through a claim of negligence if
there is privity of contract." In these states, in the absence of privity,
a plaintiff may recover only the traditional negligence damages for
personal injury or damage to real or personal property 62 Opponents of
the economic loss rule claim that "it seems capricious to deny recovery
to a vigilant property owner who discovers a latent defect, which 'only'
diminishes the value of Ins property, and allow recovery if he had
'waited' for a member of his family to be injured as a result of the
defect.
'6S
In Kentucky, lack of privity is not a bar to recovery under a
negligence action by a subsequent purchaser, but there is the requirement
that there be more than economic damages. In Saylor v. Hall,'" the court
recogmzed that damages for negligent construction could be awarded
despite the lack of privity 6 However, it remains the law in Kentucky
60 Jordan v. Talaga, 532 N.E.2d 1174, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting
Redarowicz v Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1982)).
61 See Morse/Diesel, Inc. v Trinity Indus., Inc., 859 F.2d 242, 247 (2d Cir.
1988) (under New York law "professionals are not liable either in tort or contract
absent privity" for purely economic loss); Wells v Clowers Constr. Co., 476 So.
2d 105, 106 (Ala. 1985) (action for damages from negligent construction by
party not in privity with the builder is barred); Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 556 A.2d 1126 (Md. 1989) (an ultimate nexus, such as
privity, is required between the parties for recovery for economic loss).
62 Wagman & Chen, supra note 56, at 33.
63 Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v. Franz, 885 S.W.2d 921, 926 (Ky. 1994).
64 Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
65 Saylor was an action for damages brought by tenants against the builder
of a home for negligent construction. The tenants filed suit after a fireplace
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that "tort recovery is contingent upon damage from a destructive
occurrence as contrasted with economic loss related solely to diminution
in value, even though, as to property damage, both may be measured by
the cost of repair."66
B. The Implied Warranty of Habitability
Like the cause of action based on negligence, lack of privity of
contract has also been a bar to a cause of action based on the implied
warranty of habitability 6 7 Historically, courts have held that warranty
law is fundamentally a product of contract. Therefore, privity, also a
product of contract law, has traditionally been required for a home buyer
to recover from the builder.6" As was the case with privity and negli-
gence, the requirement was first relaxed in cases involving chattels. The
requirement of privity in a case brought under an implied warranty was
first relaxed in the seminal case of Hennngsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc. 69 M 1960. The court in that case rejected the privity defense in an
action brought under the implied warranty of habitability by a remote
purchaser of an automobile. 7° Eventually, courts relaxed the pnvity
requirement in real property cases, and the current trend in state courts
is to allow subsequent purchasers a cause of action against the builder
based on the implied warranty of habitability despite the lack of
privity 71
In addition to privity, the doctrine of merger has been used to prevent
initial purchasers from recovering under implied warranties, making it
collapsed in the home they were renting, resulting in the death of one son and
injury to another. In its decision, the court discussed at length the history and
decline of the privity requirement. In concluding that the requirement of privity
is no longer a valid defense to a clami of negligent construction, the Saylor court
quoted Professor William L. Prosser: "'It is now the almost universal rule that
the contractor [builder] is liable to all those who may foreseeably be injured by
the structure, not only when he fails to disclose dangerous conditions known to
hun, but also when the work is negligently done."' Id. at 224 (quoting WILLIAM
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 104, at 681 (4th ed. 1971))
(alteration in original).
66 Franz, 885 S.W.2d at 926.
67 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
68 G. Scott Lutz, Note, Latent Defects: Subsequent Home Purchasers
Beware, 40 S.C. L. REv 1017, 1021 (1989).
69 Henmngsen v Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
70 d.
71 Cherry, supra note 25 (citing Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 69).
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virtually impossible for the subsequent purchaser to bring a cause of
action against the builder.72 The doctrine of merger states that all
contracts signed by the parties involved in the sale of a home are merged
into the deed.73 Thus, unless there are express statements to the contrary
appearing on the deed, the buyer cannot recover damages based on an
implied warranty once the deed is conveyed. 74 The case of Petersen v.
Hubschman Construction Co.75 was one of the first cases to state that
the doctrine of merger did not bar implied warranties. The court in that
case rationalized that implied warranties arise not out of the execution of
a deed, but rather stem from the agreement between the parties to the
sale. In stating that the doctrine of merger is inconsistent with the policy
behind the implied warranty, the court barred the merger defense.76 Tins
decision helped to remove yet another barrier to the purchaser of a new
home, which in turn helped the cause of the subsequent purchaser.
Despite the many possible obstacles a subsequent purchaser potential-
ly faces in bringing a cause of action against a builder based on the
implied warranty of habitability, it is this very application which has been
the subject of great debate recently both in and out of the courtroom.
77
Opponents of the recent movement toward giving subsequent purchasers
an implied warranty in the purchase of their home rely mainly on the
power of precedent and the availability of previously recognized defenses.
Advocates of the extension call on the powers of public policy
In Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc.,7 Texas joined the growing ranks of
those states which extended the implied warranty of habitability to a
subsequent purchaser.79 The decision was popular with public policy
advocates, and in 1983 one commentator wrote of the decision that "[bly
extending the implied warranty of habitability in this manner, the court
72 Libertucci, supra note 20, at 231; see Cox v Wilson, 137 S.E.2d 47 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1964); Coutrakonv. Adams, 188 N.E.2d 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963), aff'd,
201 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. 1964).
13 Libertucci, supra note 20, at 231.
74 id.
71 Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 389 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. 1979).
76 id.
77 The Uniforn Land Transactions Act contains a section which imposes an
implied warranty of quality on the sale of new homes and improvements. UNIF.
LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT (U.L.A.) § 2-309 (1986). However, no state has yet
adopted this Act, which should illustrate the level of uncertainty and skepticism
currently surrounding this area of the law.
7' Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983).
79 id.
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has adjusted the law so that it more closely parallels the home buying
practices of our mobile society, in wich people move much more
frequently than they did years ago."' Another commentator has said of
the debate that:
The logic which required the change m the law of personal property is
equally persuasive m the law of real property. The extension of implied
warranty of habitability from the original purchaser to the subsequent
purchaser is based on the fact that the builder 'holds out' his expertise
to the original buyer and fosters a reliance on that expertise. Such
reliance is not negated simply because of lack of privity between the
subsequent buyer and the builder."'
The battle to extend the doctrine has been waged inside the court-
room as well. Many arguments for the extension of the implied warranty
have been looked upon favorably One of the first states to extend an
implied warranty to subsequent purchasers was Wyoming in the case of
Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc."2 The court in that decision made its
own compelling argument for the extension by stating:
The purpose of a warranty is to protect innocent purchasers and hold
builders accountable for their work. With that object in mind, any
reasoning wlch would arbitrarily interpose a first buyer as an obstruc-
tion to someone equally as deserving of recovery is incomprehensible,
No reason has been presented to us whereby the original owner
should have the benefits of an implied warranty and the next owner
should not simply because there has been a transfer. Such intervening
sales, standing by themselves, should not, by any standard of reason-
ableness, effect an end to an implied warranty upon manifestation
of a defect. The builder always has available the defense that the defects
are not attributable to hun. 3
C. Strict Liability
A recent phenomenon is to give subsequent purchasers a cause of
action through section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,'
80 Ferguson, supra note 23, at 670.
8! Granata, supra note 44, at 149 (footnotes omitted).
82 Moxley v. Larame Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
83 Id. at 736.
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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which expands the doctrine of strict liability to nearly all cases involving
defective products." Services were traditionally not covered by the
doctrine and, therefore, builders, who have historically been perceived by
the courts as providing a service rather than a product, were not subject
to strict liability standards.86 Also, land and everything permanently
attached to it have been historically called real property and hence out of
the reach of 402A.87 Eventually, however, like with the other causes of
action now available to subsequent purchasers, the comparison between
the manufacturer of a product and the builder of a house opened the
doors to the application of strict liability to builders.88
The application of 402A to homes developed in parallel to the
extension of the implied warranty of habitability 89 By applying implied
warranties which have traditionally been reserved to the sale of chattels
to the sale of land,9" courts were paving the way, indirectly, for land to
be considered a "product" within the meaning of section 402A.9
Recently, courts have applied the doctrine of strict liability to give
subsequent purchasers a cause of action.92 For example, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas, in Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., Inc.,93 applied the
doctrine of strict liability to the sale of a house.94 Tis gave a subse-
quent purchaser a cause of action against the builder, because as the court
reasoned, "'there are no meaningful distinctions between [the] mass
production and sales of homes and the mass production and sale of
automobiles."' 95
85 Charles E. Cantu, The Ilusive Meaning of the Term "Product" Under
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 44 OKLA. L. REv 635, 637
(1991).
86 Granata, supra note 44, at 151.
87 Cantu, supra note 85, at 645.
88 Granata, supra note 44, at 151-52.
89 Cantu, supra note 85, at 645.
90 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
91 The first case to actually hold that a house is a product under section
402A was Schipper v Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965). After a
house had been proven defective and unreasonably dangerous, the doctrine of
strict liability was held to apply.
92 See, e.g., Knegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1969); Berman v Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978);
Hermes v. Stmano, 437 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1981).
9' Blagg v Fred Hunt Co., Inc., 612 S.W.2d 321 (Ark. 1981).
94 Id.
" Id. at 324 (quoting Schipper v. Levitt and Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J.
1965)).
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IV KENTUCKY's STANCE ON RELIEF TO
SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS: THE DECISION IN FRANZ
In the Franz case, plaintiffs alleged three theories of liability against
the builder, First Lexington.96 First, the Franzes alleged "negligence and
negligence per se in failing to comply with various provisions of the
umform state building code."97 Second, they alleged "breach of implied
warranties of merchantability, fitness for particular purpose, and
habitability "98 Lastly, the Franzes alleged a statutory cause of action
based on Kentucky Revised Statutes section 198B.130, which provides
for a private action for damages:
Notwithstanding any other remedies available, any person or party, m
an individual capacity or on behalf of a class of persons or parties,
damaged as a result of a violation of this chapter or the Uniform State
Building Code, has a cause of action in any court of competent
jurisdiction against the person or party who committed the violation. An
award may include damages and the cost of litigation, including
reasonable attorney's fees.99
The court in Franz first addressed the claim that First Lexington
violated an implied warranty of habitability The analysis began by
recognizing that under existing Kentucky law the implied warranty of
habitability does exist in the sale of a new dwelling to the initial
purchaser. 0 The court relied on the requirement of privity, however,
and refused to extend the implied warranty to subsequent purchasers,
thereby reversing the decision of the lower court.' ' The Supreme Court
96 Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v Franz, 885 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1994).
The plaintiffs made no attempt to recover based on strict liability.
"' Id. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
98 Franz, 885 S.W.2d at 923. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanyingtext.
99 Ky REv STAT. ANN. § 198B.130 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993). See znfra
notes 108-12.
'00 See Crawley v Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969) (discussed supra at
note 38).
'0 The Court of Appeals in this case held that the implied warranty of
habitability should be available to subsequent purchasers in the absence of
pnvity. That court would have given the Franzes "a cause of action for breach
of an implied warranty of habitability upon proof of 'latent defects which
become manifest after the subsequent owner's purchase and which were not
discoverable by reasonable inspection prior to purchase."' Franz, 885 S.W.2d at
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refused to apply the rule proposed by the lower court, which was
supported by New Hampshire law, because there was no legislation in
Kentucky from which to justify a judicial public policy decision such as
there was m New Hampshire. ' 2 In the absence of such legislative
authority, the court refused to make law "out of whole cloth."'0 3
The Franz court next addressed the issue of negligence and negli-
gence per se. The court noted that in Kentucky damages can be awarded
for negligent construction in the absence of privity 104 However, the
court recognized another bamer, the requirement of more than economic
loss.' 5 The court explained that plaintiffs must prove a "damaging
event" to recover under negligence, but the court limited this requirement
to negligence claims only 106 Noting that a negligence per se claim is
only a "negligence claim with a statutory standard of care substituted for
925 (quoting Franz v Real Estate Marketing, Inc., No. 92-CA-0003 10-MR (Ky
App. Feb. 5, 1993)). That court chose to adopt the ruling in the New Hampshire
decision of Lempke v. Dagenais, 547 A.2d 290 (N.H. 1988). In Lempke, the
extension of the implied warranty of habitability would be "limited to a
reasonable period of time" with the burden of proof on the plaintiff to "show
'that the alleged defect was caused by the [builder's] workmanship."' Id. at 297
(quoting Barnes v MacBrown and Co., 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (Ind. 1976)). The
builder's available defenses included "'that the defects were not attributable to
[the builder]; that [the defects] are the result of use or ordinary wear and tear,
or that previous owners have made substantial changes."' Id. (quoting Richard
v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427, 430 (Ariz. 1984)).
'02 The court in Lempke reached its result from what the Franz court calls a
"broad view of public policy regarding warranties," Franz, 885 S.W.2d at 926,
noting that the New Hampshire version of the Uniform Commerial Code
("U.C.C.") contains Alternative C, which abolishes the requirement of pnvity in
implied warranty suits. See Lempke, 547 A.2d at 294. The version of the U.C.C.
adopted by Kentucky did not include Alternative C. Franz, 885 S.W.2d at 926.
The court in Franz admitted that while the "U.C.C. does not apply, as such, to
selling a home, the New Hampshire version of the U.C.C. at least provides a
source from which to extrapolate a public policy." Id.
,03 Franz, 885 S.W.2d at 926.
,o Id. The court looked to Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973) in
confirming that pnvity was not required in a negligence case. See supra notes
64-65.
'0' Franz, 885 S.W.2d at 926. The court here noted that "tort recovery is
contingent upon damage from a destructive occurrence as contrasted with
economic loss related solely to diminution in value, even though, as to property
damage, both may be measured by the cost of repair." Id.
06 Id
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the common law standard of care," the court held that the negligence per
se claim based on building code violations was also barred by the require-
ment of a destructive occurrence.1
0 7
The court m Franz lastly turned its attention to the statutory cause of
action based on section 198B.130.'08 A violation of tis statute, the
court noted, provides its own remedy and is not dependent on negligence
per se.0 9 The statute does not limit damages to those that would have
been received in a tort action, therefore subjecting the claim to the
destructive occurrence requirement."0 Nor does the statute require
privity The court interpreted the statute as requiring the "payment of
either the cost of repair to bring the property up to code compliance or
payment of the diminution in fair market value of the property because
of code infractions, whichever is less."' The court held that the
issuance of the certificate of occupancy was not a complete defense to the
action but rather, at most, rebuttable evidence that defendants complied
with the building code."'
V Is FRANZ THE RiGHT ANSWER?
In terms of the evolution of the law, the most important aspect of
Franz is that subsequent purchasers of homes in Kentucky now have a
statutory cause of action against the builders of their homes for defective
construction regardless of any of the classic bamers to that claim.
However, as one dissenting opinion in Franz noted, "[n]o matter what
name is attached to the right of recovery by the majority opimon, it
remains an extension of the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent
purchasers."",13
In refusing to extend the implied warranty of habitability to subse-
quent purchasers in form if not deed, the court in Franz could find no
107 Id. at 927
108 See supra note 99 and accompanying text for relevant portion of statute.
109 Franz, 885 S.W.2d at 927
110 Id.
" I d. The court stated that "[tio interpret the statute otherwise would render
the statute meaningless because a cause of action for code violations already
exists without it under the theory of negligenceper se in KRS 446.070. We will
not reduce the statute to a useless absurdity by interpreting it as merely repetitive
of a right that already exists to pursue a negligenceper se claun if a destructive
event occurs as a violation of the building code." Id.
112 Id. at 927-28.
113 Id. at 928 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
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statutory justification for extending its rule in Crawley. The Supreme
Court looked at the New Hampshire decision in Lempke, the case on
which the Court of Appeals based its decision.'14 Because Lempke
justified the extension of the implied warranty of habitability through a
liberal Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), the court in Franz looked
to Kentucky's U.C.C. "5 However, other jurisdictions have extended the
implied warranty of habitability without ever mentioning the U.C.C.,
which leaves unanswered questions from the decision in Franz. Had the
Court of Appeals attempted to fashion a rule using, as a model, a
jurisdiction with a U.C.C. like Kentucky's instead of New Hampshire's,
would the Supreme Court's decision in Franz be different? What if New
Hampshire had rendered its decision "out of whole cloth?" Would that
mean that it would be okay for Kentucky to do the same? If all the
Supreme Court in Franz was looking for was a statutory justification to
extend the implied warranty of habitability - a nod of approval from the
legislature - why didn't it simply look at the very statute it ultimately
used to give the plaintiff relief 9 Section 198B. 130 states "[n]otwithstand-
ing any other remedies available," which certainly seems to indicate
legislative approval for an extension of the implied warranty
In choosing to provide relief under the statutory cause of action, the
court did so to give the statute a purpose, or in the court's words, to
rescue the statute from "useless absurdity ""6 The court feared that if
it extended the implied warranty or gave relief for pure economic loss
based on negligence, the statute would be redundant. However, there is
nothing extraordinary about a statute that reaffirms a judicially created
doctrine. A perfect example, and one that the Franz court itself examined,
is the codification of negligence per se in Kentucky Revised Statutes
section 446.070.1" It shouldn't matter which comes first, the statute or
the common law; they can say the same thing. This should hold true
especially when the very statute in question invites the use of other
common law remedies.
There may also be some practical problems with the path chosen by
the Franz court. The decision states that the issuance of a certificate of
occupancy is rebuttable evidence that a defendant builder complied with
the building code. However, the very nature of the defect from which
subsequent purchasers need relief is such that the defect will not be
14 See supra note 101.
1.5 See supra note 102.
116 Franz, 885 S.W.2d at 927
117 See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
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apparent at the time the inspection for the certificate of occupancy is
conducted. These defects are latent defects, which means, by definition,
they are not apparent for some time after construction and inspection.
Therefore, nearly all cases brought by subsequent purchasers will involve
homes for which a certificate of occupancy was issued, and all plaintiffs
will begin their cases with a very significant presumption against them.
The statute under which Franz gives subsequent purchasers of homes
relief only gives a cause of action m the event of a building code
violation. If this presumption is not rebutted, plaintiff cannot recover. It
seems unnecessarily burdensome for a subsequent purchaser in Kentucky
to have to start their case with the burden of production while similar
plaintiffs in other jurisdictions that use negligence, an implied warranty,
or strict liability, do not.
CONCLUSION
Kentucky has, in effect, joined the majority by allowing subsequent
purchasers a cause of action against the builders of their homes with the
decision in Franz. The debate as to the means Franz chose to achieve
these ends will rage on for years to come. Only one thing is certain: the
time has come for builder responsibility, and Kentucky clearly recognized
this in Franz. There are currently many causes of action which achieve
this goal, and as many ways to justify each. Perhaps the complexity of
the debate and the lack of a clear solution is best summed up by Special
Justice Sue Ellen Prater, who penned a dissenting opinion in Franz:
In 1986, in a schizophremc decision the New Hampshire Supreme
Court refused to extend the warranty of habitability to persons not in
privity with the builder. Two years later, in the well reasoned opinion
that is Lempke v. Dagenais, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
overturned its own precedent with only one dissenting vote. Today the
majority opinion rationalizes its decision by blaming its inaction on the
legislature. We can only hope that in the near future this Supreme Court
will be presented with an opportunity to reconsider this decision. Times
have changed, needs have changed, and this Court created law must
change.'
18
"' Franz, 885 S.W.2d at 930-31 (Prater, Special J., dissenting).
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